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Conceptual model of partnering and alliancing1
Aaron M. Anvuur and Mohan M. Kumaraswamy, M.ASCE
Partnering as a concept has matured in its application and many empirical studies provide
evidence of its impact on project performance beyond the rather prescriptive and anecdotal
claims of earlier cookbooks on the subject. What has remained elusive, however, is a guiding
theory on partnering. Drawing on the literature, partnering is explained within the framework of
intergroup contact theory and teamwork in organizations. More specifically, partnering has the
potential to create the essential conditions for optimal intergroup contact and hence, to reduce
bias and increase cooperation among construction project workgroups and, consequently,
favorably impact on project performance. Demonstrating a close fit with the published literature
on partnering provides useful support for the proposed model. The model can clearly help project
managers to focus their attention on the necessary aspects of workgroup processes that lead to
high cooperation and performance.
CE Database subject headings: Alignment; Cooperation; Partnerships; Teamwork.
1 This is the pre-publication version of Anvuur and Kumaraswamy (2007) published in Journal of Construction
Engineering and Management, 133(3), 225-234. The publisher version is available at the ASCE Civil Engineering
Database (http://dx.doi.org/10.1061/(ASCE)0733-9364(2007)133:3(225))
2Introduction
Over the last decade, partnering has gained considerable popularity. However, several
issues raise serious difficulties with the uptake of, understanding of, approach to, and
implementation of, partnering within and across different national and organizational
settings (Loraine, 1994; Green, 1999; Uher, 1999; Bresnen and Marshall, 2000a;
Bresnen and Marshall, 2000b; Li et al., 2000; Fisher and Green, 2001; Bresnen and
Marshall, 2002; Naoum, 2003). In time, research has shed light on some of the
contentious issues surrounding the concept of partnering. A number of empirical studies
(e.g., Weston and Gibson, 1993; Larson, 1995; Gransberg et al., 1999) and a plethora of
anecdotal evidence support the espoused benefits of partnering. Research highlights the
usefulness and benefits of extending the practice of partnering down the entire supply
and value chain to include subcontractors (e.g., Mathews et al., 1996; Love, 1997; Kale
and Arditi, 2001; Miller et al., 2002; Sze et al., 2003). Partnering forms of contract (e.g.,
PPC 2000) attempt to prescribe and govern the behavior and relationships of contracting
parties. While the legal status of such express good faith clauses has been questioned
and their full practical import is yet unknown (see Cornes, 1996; Cox and Thompson,
1996), these attempts demonstrate a bold commitment to overcome the legal obstacles to
the wider adoption of partnering. Some research has considered the potential impact of
different cultural and national contexts on partnering performance (e.g., Kwan and
Ofori, 2001; Liu and Fellows, 2001; Koraltan and Dikbas, 2002). With ‘success stories’
of partnering emerging from diverse cultural settings (e.g., Bennett and Baird, 2001;
Bayliss et al., 2004; Chan, Chan, Fan et al., 2004), the general view is that partnering is
by no means exclusive to any country, continent or culture.
3However, partnering still lacks conceptual-definitional specificity. Partnering is
variously defined by its outcomes or the processes involved in its implementation
(Crowley and Karim, 1995). Barlow et al. (1997) and the ECI (1997) avoid attempting a
precise definition and instead conclude that partnering is best considered as embodying a
set of processes and practices designed to promote cooperation between contracting
parties. According to Phua and Rowlinson (2004b: 45), partnering is the term for the
cooperation motif in the construction industry. Love et al. (2002: 2) conclude that
partnering is synonymous with strategic alliance. Nyström (2005: 473) concludes that ‘a
definition does not exist for this multifaceted concept’. It is argued that the confusion
over definitions is due primarily to the lack of a guiding theory on partnering as an
entity. Existing conceptual models of partnering to date (a) are cookbooks on the
concept (i.e. process models) providing guidance on best practices and ‘how to’ (e.g.,
Wilson Jr et al., 1995; Brooke and Litwin, 1997; Crane et al., 1997; Cheng and Li,
2001), (b) describe and/ or categorize various stages in the development of the
relationship amongst the parties (e.g., Ellison and Miller, 1995; Thompson and Sanders,
1998; Nyström, 2005) or (c) describe the facilitating structure for resource exchange and
decision-making amongst the parties (e.g., Crowley and Karim, 1995; Cheng et al.,
2001). While significant, these studies fail to provide sound theoretical support for the
entity of partnering and, the recommendations and observations they make.
It is in this area that this paper hopes to make a useful contribution – in providing sound
theoretical support for the processes and elements that define the entity of partnering.
The rest of the discussion is organized as follows. The next section describes the
4industry context, which gave rise to the notion of partnering. The two sections that
follow discuss, respectively, the theory of teamwork in organizational settings and the
contact hypothesis, as underpinning the partnering philosophy. Drawing on these
theories, a model for partnering is proposed. The essential factors for, and processes in,
partnering are then discussed. Evidence from the partnering literature is used for the
preliminary validation of the proposed model. The paper concludes with some
recommendations and directions for future research.
The industry context
Differentiation in the construction industry, especially subcontracting, is a response to
uncertainty arising from complexity (Eccles, 1981b). This creates a situation of
interdependence, which makes cooperation crucial to the success of construction
projects. This complexity, uncertainty and interdependence have significant implications
for the organization, control and coordination of construction projects (Eccles, 1981b;
Gidado, 1996; Shirazi et al., 1996; Dubois and Gadde, 2002; Winch, 2003). Typically,
construction coping strategies, e.g., competitive tendering, arms-length contracts
incorporating manipulative performance incentive and, industry ‘communities of
practice’, allowed these complexity and uncertainty dimensions to be addressed while
guarding against opportunistic behavior (Bradach and Eccles, 1989; Dubois and Gadde,
2002).
As project complexity and uncertainty intensify (e.g., due to sophistication of human
needs, technological advances, market pressures), extensive subcontracting ensues and
5interdependence deepens. These coping strategies soon become erosive in nature. Zero-
sum competitive tendencies, arising from the market extent and increased
differentiation, soon lead to fragmentation and adversarial relationships. Contracts are
more complex and are routinely written or amended to exclude or transfer liability. As
the focus shifts to the contract, short-term productivity (i.e. performance quantity) is
favored over the long-term sustainability and quality considerations and, innovation
suffers (Thompson et al., 1998; Dubois and Gadde, 2002).
Over time, these negative relationships and attitudes have become institutionalized (i.e.,
affective priming) and, arguably, part of the culture of construction (Egan, 1998; CIRC,
2001). This has resulted in stereotyping (of each other and professions), and even
prejudice, among the various stakeholders (i.e., cognitive priming), which then
constrains future relationships (Moore and Dainty, 2001). This adversarial culture has
been partly blamed for the poor uptake of new processes and management strategies in
the construction industry (Bresnen and Marshall, 2001). It is in this context that the idea
of partnering was conceived and introduced. Partnering thus provides a promise of
cooperation in an industry setting where commercial pressures traditionally encourage
reticence, caution and even adversarial relationships. But just how does partnering
achieve this? The next two sections discuss two theories put forward in this paper as the
conceptual bases for partnering.
6The team approach in organizations
Construction is considered largely as a ‘team’ industry (Turner, 1997; Love et al., 1998;
Holti et al., 1999; Anumba et al., 2002; Male, 2002). It is usual for the representatives of
the client, consultants and constructors on a construction project to be called the ‘project
team’. However, these are workgroups and do not necessarily become teams because
someone calls them so (Katzenbach and Smith, 1993; Albanese, 1994; Fleming and
Koppelman, 1996; Ingram et al., 1997; Schermerhorn et al., 1998). In order to avoid
confusion terms like integrated project team, though tautological, are now gaining
prominence in usage (SFC, 2003; Baiden et al., 2006). Katzenbach and Smith (1993:
112) defines a team as ‘a small number of people with complementary skills who are
committed to a common purpose, set of performance goals, and approach for which they
hold themselves mutually accountable’.
The characteristics of optimal teams can be summarized as follows (West, 1990;
Katzenbach and Smith, 1993; Albanese, 1994; Ingram et al., 1997; Anderson and West,
1998; Chow et al., 2005): (a) unitary focus and common goals; (b) interdependence, i.e.
mutual respect, equal status and equal opportunities for participation; (c) mutual
accountability, i.e. common fate and a ‘no blame’ culture; and (d) confluence, i.e.
cohesion, seamless operation. These characteristics do not emerge easily. They are the
results of the long and, sometimes difficult interactions through which the members (a)
cultivate collective understandings of the membership and nature of the task and, (b)
negotiate and shape their purposes in response to the demand or challenge. This
commitment-building process ultimately leads to the establishment of a social contract
7that binds the membership to a common purpose and approach (Schein, 1980;
Katzenbach and Smith, 1993). Effective teams translate their shared purpose into
specific performance goals and targets and periodically assess their joint performance
against these targets. These outputs typically include both individual and ‘collective
work products’ (Katzenbach and Smith, 1993). Mutual accountability grows out of the
shared goals and cooperative interdependence engendered through the interactions of
members (Johnson and Johnson, 2003).
Task interdependency is a pre-requisite (Shaw, 1981; Anderson and West, 1998).
Members need to be selected on the basis of complementary technical/functional
expertise and personality traits. Active training, expert facilitation and coaching
facilitate this commitment-building process (Drew and Coulson-Thomas, 1996). Top
management support must be both articulated and enacted. Without it, any sense of
sharedness the team may develop will be largely subversive in character (West, 1990;
Anderson and West, 1998). Confluence is a gestalt concept in which the boundaries of
the self and the team merge. It is the optimal team climate for high performance and
innovation (Reichers and Schneider, 1990; Anderson and West, 1998). Anderson and
West (1994) define team climate as ‘the norms, atmosphere, practices, interpersonal
relationships, enacted rituals and ways of working developed by a team’. Confluence
manifests itself in the cohesion, synergy and high performance of the team (Syer and
Connolly, 1996). It is the result of the long and, often, painful commitment-building
process through which the team evolves and learns, particularly from its failures and
successes (Katzenbach and Smith, 1993).
8The benefits of teamwork include, among others, breaking down barriers to effective
communication and establishing cross-functional cooperation (Pinto and Pinto, 1990;
Albanese, 1994; Drew and Coulson-Thomas, 1996), which leads to trust and
commitment (Katzenbach and Smith, 1993) and, high performance and innovation
(Lampman and Dimeo, 1989; Pinto and Pinto, 1990; Todryk, 1990; Katzenbach and
Smith, 1993; Albanese, 1994; Fleming and Koppelman, 1996).
The Contact Hypothesis
Researchers in social psychology have, for many years, studied the subject of prejudice
and bias in intergroup contact situations to understand their causes and to develop
effective strategies for mitigating them. An understanding of how such intergroup bias
and conflict arises is provided by Tajfel’s (1978, 1982) and Tajfel and Turner’s (1979)
work on social categorization and social identity theory. According to these theories,
categorization of people into distinct groups is sufficient in itself to create intergroup
bias in business as well as social settings. In addition, factors that increase intergroup
bias tend to increase the saliency of the categorized representation. According to Tajfel
and Turner (1979), an individual’s need for positive self-identity motivates social
comparisons that favorably differentiate ingroup from outgroup members. Ingroup
members are viewed as being very similar to self, are evaluated more positively and
receive greater pro-social (i.e. helping) behavior than outgroup members. Such bias,
however, leads to ingroup favoritism but, not necessarily, to outgroup discrimination
(Gaertner et al., 2000). Support for these theories is also available in the context of
construction (see Phua, 2004; Phua and Rowlinson, 2004a). A possible solution is
9therefore to seek strategies that could alter the categorization of ingroup and outgroup
memberships.
At the core of this research effort is the contact hypothesis (Allport, 1954). According to
Allport (1954), four key conditions are essential for optimal (i.e. positive) intergroup
contact: (a) equal group status within the contact situation; (b) common goals; (c)
intergroup cooperative interaction; and (d) support of authorities, law or custom. Field,
archival, survey and laboratory research, in different organizational and social settings,
supports the contact hypothesis (see Sherif and Sherif, 1966; Pettigrew, 1998; Gaertner
and Dovidio, 2000). Pettigrew (1998) identifies four distinct but interrelated processes
that operate through contact and mediate change: (a) learning about the outgroup; (b)
changing behavior; (c) generating affective ties; and (d) ingroup reappraisal. It is these
processes that create the sense of sharedness that reduces bias and promotes cooperation.
Optimal intergroup contact requires time and repeated contact to achieve as it is related
to the extent to which groups learn (Sherif and Sherif, 1966).
Institutional and societal norms structure the form and effects of contact situations.
According to Wilner et al. (1955), quoted in Pettigrew (1998: 68), ‘contact and
perceived social climate tend to reinforce each other when their influence operates in the
same direction, and to cancel each other out when their influence works in the opposite
direction.’ If present, such normative support also makes the attainment of other optimal
contact conditions easier (Pettigrew, 1998; Gaertner and Dovidio, 2000). Also, prior
experiences and attitudes influence contact effects so that people with favorable prior
experience of contact are more likely to seek, and those with bad experiences are more
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inclined to avoid, future contact (Pettigrew, 1997; Pettigrew, 1998). Positive events that
may lead to mood elevation, like rewards associated with intergroup cooperative
interaction or success, in turn lead to broader and more inclusive categorization
(Gaertner et al., 1993; Gaertner and Dovidio, 2000).
What partnering does?
The convergence of ideas from these hitherto related but separate lines of literature is
remarkable. Taken together, they spell out what should be the essential factors for
optimal project workgroup relationships in construction: (1) equal status or respect; (2)
common goals; (3) cooperative workgroup interaction; and (4) support of the authorities
and egalitarian norms. Confluence, optimal intergroup contact or good ‘project
chemistry’ (see Nicolini, 2002), relates to how the team learns over time from failures
and successes and is therefore an outcome of workgroup processes. These lines of
literature clarify the context in which partnering in construction should be viewed and
understood. It is argued that partnering is a change mechanism for transforming a cross-
functional project workgroup into a team. In other words, partnering has the potential to
create the essential conditions for optimal contact between cross-functional project
workgroups. Thus, rather than pre-existing the partnering relationship, these essential
factors are the outcomes of successful partnering (see also Mosley et al., 1991; Cowan et
al., 1992; Moore et al., 1992). Albanese (1994) refers to these essential factors or
outcomes of successful partnering as process benefits. These process benefits are the
vehicle through which the content benefits (e.g., cooperation, improved performance and
innovation) are achieved.
11
Based on the foregoing, Figure 1, adapted from the common ingroup identity model of
Gaertner et al.’s (1993), has been developed to present a model of partnering and its
consequences on cooperation and project performance outcomes. The left hand column
of Figure 1 depicts the dominant industry conditions, as discussed earlier, that are the
genesis of the notion of partnering. The second column outlines the key components of
partnering that are important in helping project workgroups attain the essential
conditions for optimal contact. When attained, these essential factors (see the third
column of Figure 1) transform a workgroup into a high-performing team. The right hand
column depicts the benefits or consequences of partnering. While the focus in
construction research has been mainly on demonstrating the content benefits of
partnering (e.g., outcomes on cost, quality and schedule) as its focal selling aspect, it is
important to also note the many mediating cognitive and affective processes (e.g., trust,
positive affect) involved (Gaertner et al., 1993; Pettigrew, 1998). The next section
explains, on the basis of the proposed model, the key components of partnering practice
and their importance.
Explaining the key components of partnering practice
The key components of partnering practice include (Hellard, 1995; Schultzel and Unruh,
1996; Thomas and Thomas, 2005): workshops and champions’ meetings; charters and
decision-making procedures; incentives; and periodic performance evaluation. These are
explained in light of the proposed theory on partnering.
12
Workshops and champions’ meetings
The partnering workshops and periodic champions meetings provide opportunities for
project workgroups to interact in a cooperative and non-threatening environment. These
interactions kick-start the process of learning about and understanding one another’s
interests and concerns, which ultimately enables the project actors to collectively create,
shape and own a set of common goals and approach for the project (Katzenbach and
Smith, 1993; Pettigrew, 1998). Senior management’s expression of support for this
process is crucial for its success. Selecting members with the necessary technical or
functional expertise is important not least because competence strongly predicts task
performance (Motowidlo and Van Scotter, 1994) and trust (Das and Teng, 1998), both
key outcomes as depicted in Figure 1. Training, expert facilitation and coaching help
this process by encouraging honest and frank communication and problem solving in
workgroups (Katzenbach and Smith, 1993; Drew and Coulson-Thomas, 1996). The
champions’ meetings serve to perpetuate this commitment-building or re-alignment
process throughout the life of the project.
Charters and problem-solving procedures
Arguably, the problem in construction is a lack of recognition, rather than the absence,
of task/functional interdependence. This fragmentation is a direct result of the industry
context described earlier. Partnering thus seeks to force recognition of interdependence.
The partnering charter and the joint decision-making procedures, otherwise called ‘issue
escalation ladder’, provide testament to a joint recognition of interdependence by the
project workgroup members. They are a testament to the social contract that binds the
project workgroup to develop, and commit to, a common purpose and approach for
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achieving the project. The issue escalation ladder provides a mechanism for ensuring
and sustaining cooperative interaction and for channeling controversy productively,
however divisive members’ differences may be. Mutual accountability grows naturally
out of working together with a common purpose, goals and approach (Katzenbach and
Smith, 1993; Pettigrew, 1998).
Top management support is required to reinforce the commitment-building process
among project workgroup members. This support must be both articulated and enacted.
Using partnering forms of contract or incorporating partnering-friendly amendments into
traditional contracts also provides articulated support. Probably even more important is
the provision of enacted support for cooperation, which includes some budget authority
and authority to make technical decisions (or ‘do deals’) independent of direct functional
interference. Such support is vital for successful implementation of the popular principle
of resolving disputes at the lowest possible level and, is a key feature that distinguishes
teams from committees (West, 1990; Anderson and West, 1998). Without the necessary
authority support, teams function as committees (Fleming and Koppelman, 1996) and
any shared goals, approach or climate developed will be largely subversive in character
(Pettigrew, 1998; Gaertner and Dovidio, 2000).
Team incentives
Rewards associated with pleasant cooperative interaction or successes enhance mutual
attraction and lead to more favorable and inclusive categorization of the workgroup
memberships (Gaertner et al., 1993; Drew and Coulson-Thomas, 1996). These rewards
range from very simple things like barbecues, field trips or official recognition of
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achievement in project newsletters and electronic mail, to the sharing of bonuses for
achieving or exceeding performance targets. These team incentive arrangements usually
operate independently of any performance incentives in the underlying legal contracts
between the parties. One (relatively) successful application of team incentives in
construction is in project alliancing. Project alliancing is, probably, best described as a
deeper form of partnering, which contractually links the financial success of each of the
parties directly to the overall success of the project.
The alliance agreement is drawn up as an overarching legal agreement (Halman and
Braks, 1999; Barlow, 2000; Naoum, 2003) or constitutes the sole contract (Hauck et al.,
2004; Rowlinson et al., 2006), which binds the parties to agreed targets, risk sharing and
reward mechanisms. In the former arrangement, the underlying individual traditional
contracts between the client and the suppliers gives the client the option of continuing
the project conventionally should the alliance agreement fail (Halman and Braks, 1999;
Barlow, 2000). However, in both arrangements the Alliance Agreement provides both
articulated and enacted support for cooperation by creating, and facilitating the
development of, a deepened and real, as opposed to a notional, sense of joint/ common
fate (Halman and Braks, 1999; Barlow, 2000; Bower and Merna, 2002; Hauck et al.,
2004; Rowlinson et al., 2006). These are essential factors in achieving team cohesion or
confluence as shown in Figure 1.
Periodic performance assessments
Translating its common purpose into specific performance goals and associated targets
allows the team to chalk up small successes as it pursues its broader purpose
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(Katzenbach and Smith, 1993). The mutuality, specificity, clarity, measurability and
attainability of these performance goals and targets are therefore crucial (Locke and
Latham, 1990; Katzenbach and Smith, 1993; Liu and Fellows, 2001). These are typically
addressed during the value management sessions organized as part of the initial
partnering workshops and reinforced during follow-up workshops and champions’
meetings. These goals facilitate communication and constructive controversy and are
‘symbols of accomplishment that motivate and energize’ (Katzenbach and Smith, 1993:
113). Periodic performance assessments provide vital feedback in real time, which
facilitates group learning and improvement to influence future performance (Katzenbach
and Smith, 1993). Sherif and Sherif’s (1966) infamous Robbers’ Cave field experiment
showed that effectiveness related to the extent to which the groups learn from successes
and failures in intergroup cooperation and rivalry. Although this sort of learning is
attempted during initial partnering workshops through resource dilemma games, the
consequences of real life successes and failures are both graphic and compelling.
Validation of model of partnering
Varied research in construction supports the proposed model. These include industry
sponsored research into partnering (e.g., CII, 1991; Bennett and Jayes, 1995; Lenard et
al., 1996; Chan, Chan, Fan et al., 2004), as well as general research on partnering (e.g.,
Cook and Hancher, 1990; Larson and Drexler, 1997; Conley and Gregory, 1999; Black
et al., 2000; Cheng et al., 2000; Glagola and Sheedy, 2002; Ng et al., 2002; Chan, Chan,
Chiang et al., 2004; Fisher, 2004), alliancing (Barlow et al., 1997; Halman and Braks,
1999; Barlow, 2000; Hauck et al., 2004; Rowlinson et al., 2006) and relational
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contracting (e.g., Hampson and Kwok, 1997; Davis, 1999; Rahman and Kumaraswamy,
2002). Many studies also highlight the roles of partnering as a team-building mechanism
and as a catalyst for cultural change (e.g., Mosley et al., 1991; Moore et al., 1992;
Abudayyeh, 1994; Albanese, 1994; Brown, 1994; Wilson Jr et al., 1995; Miles, 1996;
Gardiner and Simmons, 1998; Winch, 2000; Nicolini, 2002; Beach et al., 2005).
However, these studies also create problems, which stand in the way of uniform
understanding of the partnering concept. These issues are next discussed and clarified in
the context of the proposed model of partnering in Figure 1.
Partnering critical success factors and outcomes
Rockart (1982: 4) defines critical success factors as ‘those few key [factors] absolutely
necessary to reach goals’. It is clear from this definition that any study of critical success
factors without conceptual-definitional clarity is likely to be counterproductive. Many of
the research studies on partnering mention one or more of the essential factors for
optimal contact listed in Figure 1 as critical success factors for partnering. From the
foregoing, it is clear that these cannot be critical success factors for partnering. Rather,
they are the outcomes or process benefits of successful partnering. Partnering is the
mechanism through which these conditions for optimal contact are induced and
nurtured. Thus, taken to an extreme, partnering may well be viewed as an experiment in
social psychology. Adopting a critical success factors perspective, and as argued in this
paper, these factors are critical success factors for optimal cross-functional workgroup
cooperation.
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The role of trust
Numerous studies mention trust and/or its correlates as critical success factors for
partnering (e.g., Larson and Drexler, 1997; Black et al., 2000; Cheng et al., 2000;
Fisher, 2004). However, as indicated in the consequences section (top, right) of Figure 1,
trust is a secondary outcome of partnering. In other words, trust need not pre-exist the
partnering relationship. As indicated in the pre-contact experience box (bottom, left) of
Figure 1, trust can pre-exist a partnering relationship and, may result from previous
favorable contact experiences or representations (Pettigrew, 1998), or it may be
spontaneous, resulting from ‘faith in humanity’ (McKnight et al., 1998). When present,
trust creates norms of obligation and cooperation and minimizes transaction costs (Jones
and George, 1998; Korczynski, 2000). Research also shows that norms of obligation and
cooperation lead to both interpersonal and inter-organizational trust (Sandler, 1993;
Barney and Hansen, 1994; Das and Teng, 1998; Jones and George, 1998; Rousseau et
al., 1998). Also, strategies of consistent cooperative behavior influence all dimensions or
systems of trust (Das and Teng, 1998; Jones and George, 1998; McKnight et al., 1998).
Admittedly, the dynamic and cyclical nature of trust makes an understanding of its
development somewhat elusive. But, a closer look at trust development shows that the
long-term is built from the short-term, rather than vice versa (Oberschall and Leifer,
1986). Besides, if trust were a pre-requisite, then the introduction of partnering would
not even be necessary in the first place. Therefore, trust is more a consequence of, than a
means for, the achievement of cooperation (see also Katzenbach and Smith, 1993;
Abudayyeh, 1994; Albanese, 1994; Lazar, 2000; Wood and McDermott, 2001).
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Contractual incentives
The use of performance incentives in the underlying contracts between contracting
parties has also been cited as a critical success factor for partnering. Research shows that
incentives do drive behavior (e.g., Ashley and Workman, 1986; Kohn, 1993; Tyler and
Blader, 2000). However, research also shows that their use can be problematic and
sometimes even counterproductive. The discourse on performance incentives usually
confounds firms with the managers representing them (see Bresnen and Marshall,
2000a; Bresnen and Marshall, 2000b). Agency theory, which underpins the use of
performance incentives, assumes that agents will shirk unless their actions contribute
directly to their own economic self-interest. Therefore, shirking can only be mitigated
through monitoring combined with contracts (incorporating sanctioning and reward
mechanisms) that appeal to their self-seeking nature (Simon, 1991). However, here the
agent is a firm and not the manager(s) representing that firm. Even at the top executive
levels of firms there is considerable opportunity for discrepancy between the goal of
owners (i.e., profit) and the goals of managers (Oberschall and Leifer, 1986; Simon,
1991). No doubt, managers have an interest in the long-term success of their
organizations. However, the link between such performance incentives and the
mitigation of the pursuit of managerial short-term self-interest is, rather, indirect and
tenuous (for an explication of this argument, see Simon, 1991; Kohn, 1993; Pfeffer,
1994, 1997; Tyler and Blader, 2000).
Most importantly, performance incentives can work against the objectives of the project
organization. With managers making positional commitments to defend or protect the
interests of their respective firms, performance incentives can lead to sub-optimal
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outcomes for the project. They encourage a myopic focus on the specified tasks that
influence the outcomes they are tied to, reduce risk-taking behavior and, hence limit
performance quality and innovation (Simon, 1991; Kohn, 1993; Pfeffer, 1997;
Thompson et al., 1998). Measurement problems further complicate the use of
performance incentives on construction projects. Uncertainty means that a clear and
precise definition of performance standards/ specifications in advance is both impossible
and undesirable. Intense interdependence makes it difficult to isolate and measure to a
reasonable level of accuracy each firm’s contribution to an outcome or liability for a
default. With complexity and uncertainty being the hallmarks of all but, perhaps, the
simplest construction projects, even the most ‘objective’ indices of performance are at
best inadequate and highly corruptible (Simon, 1991; Kohn, 1993; Fernie et al., 2006).
Ashley and Workman (1986) found that although overall performance (quantity) was
marginally greater with their use, contractual incentives created significantly more
contractual disputes between the contracting parties. Thompson et al. (1998) concluded
that rather than a means to unite the parties, contractual incentives serve as “a wedge to
drive distance between them” (p.36).
The objective of contractual incentives ought to be to motivate the various project actors
to identify with the project’s objectives. Without prejudice to the individual preferences
of clients or procuring agents, a project’s objectives are best served if the incentive
arrangement results in a sharing of, rather than merely transferring, motive. This
underscores the famous principle of ‘shared risks unify motives’ (Barnes, 1981; Bower
et al., 2002). The ‘sharedness’ of motive is affected by how responsibilities and risks are
apportioned, the reimbursement and governance structures in place (Thompson et al.,
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1998; Bower et al., 2002). This leads back to the central thesis of this paper: by
facilitating the attainment of optimal contact factors, partnering creates a sense of
superordinate identification with the project organization. The objective function for all
managers is, therefore, the optimization of the project’s objectives. This explains the
move towards the use of ‘partnering-friendly’ contracts that emphasize the fairness of
risk/reward arrangements. Some go a step further and seek to prescribe the behavior and
relationship among the parties (e.g., ICE, 1993). Research also shows that judgments on
the fairness of procedures experienced and outcomes received affect perceptions of
status (or respect) and trust (Gaertner and Dovidio, 2000; Tyler and Blader, 2000;
Kadefors, 2005). While the legal basis of some of the provisions of these contracts have
been challenged (e.g., see Cox and Thompson, 1996) and their practical import is yet
unknown, these contracts are indicative of articulated support for cooperation (see
Anderson and West, 1998).
Early involvement of ‘ partners’
This facilitates the above-described group processes and is, perhaps, a common sense
approach dictated by systems thinking and knowledge of the construction project value
and cost cycles (Bower, 2002; Male, 2002).
Partnering and strategic alliances
Partnering and strategic alliances are forms of relational contracting (see Macneil, 1978;
Williamson, 1985; Bradach and Eccles, 1989; Rahman and Kumaraswamy, 2002).
However, there is a conceptual difference between them. Assuming a continuum exists
of possible relational contracting arrangements (as suggested in Bennett and Jayes,
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1998; Thompson et al., 1998), although such a view has been argued to be misleading
(see Bradach and Eccles, 1989), partnering and strategic alliances are the poles of this
continuum. A strategic alliance is a long-term interorganizational arrangement for
mutual benefit, which is based on equivalence and high complementarity (Kanter, 1994;
Cox, 1996; Hampson and Kwok, 1997). Because of their long-term nature, strategic
alliances facilitate interorganizational learning, which is important for the commitment-
building process and increases the chance of achieving optimal contact (Katzenbach and
Smith, 1993; Pettigrew, 1998; Love et al., 2002). In other words, a strategic alliance is a
cooperative relationship between parties when some shared expectation about the future
(i.e. trust) exists. There is evidence of the existence of trust-based relationships in the
construction industry between main and subcontractors (e.g., Eccles, 1981a; Hampson
and Kwok, 1997; Kale and Arditi, 2001) and also between clients and main contractors
(e.g., Tse, 1984; Loraine, 1994; Bennett and Jayes, 1998; Barlow, 2000).
However, the future is rarely pre-ordained. Instead, the future is built on the basis of past
and present actions. As Oberschall and Leifer (1986: 248) put it: ‘a lot of effort is
required before there is an indefinite transaction future ahead to constrain exploitative
behavior’. Asset specificity and uncertainty can grow out of such effort, rather than
being present from the start, and facilitate a trust relationship. Many of the strategic
alliances or term arrangements in the offshore construction sector grew out of many
successful competitively let contracts, which themselves lasted several years (Loraine,
1994). This underlines the crucial role of partnering as a transformative mechanism
through which such a future can be constructed (see Figure 1). Partnering provides a
mechanism through which to foster cooperation in a project environment where trust is
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limited or non-existent. This favorable contact then increases the likelihood and
attractiveness of future contact and, constitutes the foundation of a trust-based
relationship (Albanese, 1994; Pettigrew, 1998; Spatz, 2000).
Industry level cultural transformation
The ultimate aim of most project managers is to motivate their workgroups to change or
modify their behaviors in ways that will lead to and/or facilitate the achievement of the
project’s objectives. However, for others, e.g. governments and large clients, who are
concerned that the construction industry as a whole is too adversarial and therefore
needs to change, the goal extends beyond the needs of a single project to an effort to
catalyze a cultural transformation. But some question how, if at all, partnering can
transform the culture of construction (e.g., Bresnen and Marshall, 2000b; Fisher and
Green, 2001). One of the major arguments is that behavioral change is not necessarily
due to or indicative of a cultural transformation. However, behavioral change often
precedes attitudinal change. The dissonance between new behavior and old prejudices is
resolved by revising one’s attitudes, which process also benefits from extended and/or
repeated contact (Pettigrew, 1998). As cooperation between organizations ultimately
reduces to cooperation between individual managers from the different organizations
(Smith et al., 1995), it appears that the key question is whether or not contact effects
generalize to other members not present in the project situation and also across different
settings.
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According to Pettigrew’s (1998) reformulated intergroup contact theory, three sequential
strategies allow generalization of contact effects to the outgroup. These are
decategorization (see Hewstone and Brown, 1986), salient categorization (see Brewer
and Miller, 1984) and recategorization (see Gaertner et al., 1993). Decategorization
reduces bias by diminishing the salience of original ingroup/outgroup categorizations.
Recategorization results in a one-group identity or a superordinate (inclusive) identity
that highlights the similarities among the interactants and thus obscures the ‘them-and-
us’ boundary (Gaertner et al., 1993). These processes require a long-term perspective
facilitative of individual and group learning (see also Kanter, 1994; Love et al., 2002).
Progression through these three stages of categorization is not automatic and,
recategorization into a single group is often not attained (Pettigrew, 1998). In the
specific case of construction, recategorization into a single group may not even be
desirable since the original organizational identities of workgroup members cannot be
forsaken. As Gaertner et al. (1993) demonstrate, it is possible to maintain a dual
representation in which both superordinate and original group identities are
simultaneously salient.
Pettigrew (1997) found that intergroup friendship has the potential to invoke all the
mediating processes required to achieve optimal intergroup contact. As a result,
Pettigrew (1998) proposed a fifth condition for the contact hypothesis: friendship
potential. This opportunity implies the potential for extended and/or repeated contact in
a variety of business and social contexts in which the close interactions lead to self-
disclosure and other individualizing experiences (Pettigrew, 1998; Gaertner and
Dovidio, 2000). The importance of close personal relationships in different sectors of
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economic life has been demonstrated by many studies (e.g., Granovetter, 1985; Bradach
and Eccles, 1989; Phua and Rowlinson, 2004b). The importance of the time dimension
to the group learning process makes optimal contact difficult to achieve within the
lifespan of a single project (see Cook and Hancher, 1990; DeVilbiss and Leonard, 2000).
However, the role of partnering in initiating and facilitating this commitment-building
process is very significant. It creates the foundation on which the future is built and is a
catalyst for change. There is also evidence from the partnering literature that projects
that did not satisfy most of the essential contact conditions reported improved
cooperation and where these were present, performance expectations were met or even
exceeded. For many project managers, this is a significant achievement in itself in an
industry where cooperation (and hence, good performance) is an aberration.
Conclusions and directions for future research
This paper has presented a model (see Figure 1) that provides conceptual-definitional
clarity on partnering. The relevance of the key processes, tools and techniques involved
in, and outcomes of, partnering as well as the link to cooperation and project
performance have been discussed. By drawing on two related but separate lines of
literature in social psychology, four essential factors for optimal cross-functional
workgroup cooperation have been identified. The role of partnering as the
transformative mechanism through which these essential factors are induced and
nurtured has been explained and corroborated with evidence from the published
literature on the concept. It is believed that direct testing of the model will be required
before it can be fully validated and deployed. But even in this state, the model can
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clearly help project managers to focus their attention on the necessary aspects of
workgroup processes that lead to high cooperation and good performance.
By clarifying the role and goals of partnering, the stage is set for a more focused and
purposeful study of other key aspects of the concept. This model provides some useful
indications on the direction of such research. While support for the relationships
portrayed in the model is readily available, there is still a need to test the strengths of
these relationships in the context of the overall model. Another reason why the model
could benefit from some forms of direct testing is because some of the evidence on
which these relationships have been determined falls outside the realm of construction,
thus leaving open the question of their validity in the context of construction. One
obvious limitation to direct testing, however, is the fact that the experimental nature of
these study designs makes direct replication in construction management research
almost impossible. Still, conceptual replication through correlational studies is still
considered possible. The internal validity of any significant correlations is not an issue
since the directions of causality have already been determined in these experimental
designs.
Additional support is required for the link between partnering and the four essential
factors hypothesized in the model. Empirical evidence of the link between the essential
factors and cooperation is needed, although anecdotal support abounds. The same is true
of the relationship between cooperation and project performance outcomes. Phua and
Rowlinson (2004b) provide some support for this relationship in their grounded study of
critical success factors for project success. However, their measure of cooperation taps
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only one dimension of the construct and other factors identified in their study
confounded the cooperation effects. But even this limited measure of cooperation
explained about 28% of the variability in the dependent variable ‘project success’,
defined in terms of meeting budget, schedule and quality performance targets. More
evidence is therefore required in this regard. Wagner (1995) provides partial support for
the moderating effect of culture on cooperation, but Phua and Rowlinson (2004a) did not
establish any such moderator role for culture. Therefore, some direct measure of the
influence of culture on the hypothesized relationships in the model will be very useful.
This can be considered in future research.
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